Mahan prepared a secret contingency plan of 1890 in case war should break out between Britain and the United States. Fourth, his recognition of the influence of geography on strategy was tempered by a strong appreciation of the power of contingency to affect outcomes.
#ALFRED THAYER MAHAN FREE#
Third, his economic ideal was free trade rather than autarchy. Second, his unit of political analysis insofar as sea power was concerned was a transnational consortium rather than the single nation-state. Sumida (2000) argues Mahan believed that good political and naval leadership was no less important than geography when it came to the development of sea power. Mahan argued that radical technological change does not eliminate uncertainty from the conduct of war, and therefore a rigorous study of history should be the basis of naval officer education. Navy was building long-range submarines to raid Japanese shipping, but the Japanese, still tied to Mahan, designed their submarines as ancillaries to the fleet and failed to attack American supply lines in the Pacific in World War II. His theories-written before the submarine became a factor in warfare against shipping-delayed the introduction of convoys as a defense against German U-Boats in World War I. Mahan contended that with command of the sea, even if local and temporary, naval operations in support of land forces can be of decisive importance and that naval supremacy can be exercised by a transnational consortium acting in defense of a multinational system of free trade. This called for concentration of naval forces composed of capital ships, not unduly large but numerous, well manned with crews thoroughly trained, and operating under the principle that the best defense is an aggressive offense. This control of the sea could not be achieved by destruction of commerce but only by destroying or neutralizing the enemy fleet. This not only permitted the maintenance of sea communications for one's own ships while denying their use to the enemy but also, if necessary, provided the means for close supervision of neutral trade. The primary mission of a navy was to secure the command of the sea. His theoretical framework came from Jomini, with an emphasis on strategic locations (such as chokepoints, canals, and coaling stations), as well as quantifiable levels of fighting power in a fleet. His goal was to discover the laws of history that determined who controlled the seas. Mahan believed that national greatness was inextricably associated with the sea, with its commercial usage in peace and its control in war. Mahan used history as a stock of lessons to be learned-or more exactly, as a pool of examples that exemplified his theories.
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